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OPINION OF THE COURT
______
Garth, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Alan Macfarlan’s appeal requires us to review
the application of judicial estoppel to his complaint. The
District Court judge denied Macfarlan relief as to all counts
of his complaint. Primary among the court’s rulings was the
grant of summary judgment to Macfarlan’s former employer,
Ivy Hill SNF, LLC (“Ivy Hill”) based upon judicial estoppel.
We will affirm.
I.
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Macfarlan’s notice of appeal states that he was
appealing only “. . . from the Final Judgment and Order
entered on May 12, 2011 denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the District Court’s Granting Summary
Judgment to Defendant.” That motion pertained only to his
Count 1 claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). Macfarlan also seeks our relief based upon other
Acts which refer to his disability and which were the subject
of Counts 2-4 of his amended complaint. The main challenge
that Macfarlan makes, however, is to the District Court’s
application of judicial estoppel. We first dispose of two
aspects of his appeal which have come to our attention. Ivy
Hill raised no objection to either the form of order entered by
the District Court or to the limited nature of Macfarlan’s
Notice of Appeal.
a. The District Court’s order
On July 28, 2010, the District Court granted summary
judgment to Ivy Hill on Counts 2-4 of Macfarlan’s amended
complaint and on his FMLA retaliation claim, which was part
of Count 1.
Ivy Hill thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration as to Macfarlan’s remaining Count 1 FMLA
claim.
In its November 9, 2010 order granting Ivy Hill’s
motion for reconsideration and entering summary judgment
for Ivy Hill, the District Court, among other rulings, granted
the defendant, Ivy Hill, summary judgment on Macfarlan’s
remaining claim based on judicial estoppel, and therefore
denied relief to Macfarlan on his entire Count 1 FMLA claim.
In the same order, the District Court then ruled that “Count I
of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.”
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When summary judgment is granted to the prevailing
party, it is inappropriate and erroneous to dismiss the very
complaint that gave rise to the summary judgment order.
While no substantial right of Macfarlan was affected by the
form of the District Court’s order, nonetheless good practice
dictates that the complaint on which judgment is entered
cannot and should not be “dismissed.”
Accordingly,
Macfarlan not having been prejudiced by the form of the
District Court’s order, we now disregard the District Court’s
order of dismissal and review only the summary judgment
disposition, which is the gravamen of Macfarlan’s appeal.
b. The Notice of Appeal
Macfarlan filed a Notice of Appeal only “from the
final judgment and order entered on May 12, 2011 denying
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s
order granting summary judgment to Defendant.” In normal
course, we would confine our review to the one issue
appealed, i.e. reconsideration of the District Court’s order that
granted summary judgment to Ivy Hill for alleged violation of
the FMLA. However, while Ivy Hill, as noted, did not object
to our consideration of the other counts in Macfarlan’s
amended complaint, and indeed, addressed them in its brief,
we sua sponte have the obligation of considering and
confining an appellant to the issue which he has chosen to
appeal. See Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d
1252, 1254 (1977) (“When an appeal is taken from a
specified judgment only or from a part of a specified
judgment, the court of appeals acquires thereby no
jurisdiction to review other judgments or portions thereof not
so specified or otherwise fairly to be inferred from the notice
as intended to be presented for review on the appeal.”).
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However, we are informed by our precedent in Murray
v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 782 F.2d 432, 434-35
(3d Cir. 1986), that in circumstances comparable to
Macfarlan, we will review the arguments of an appellant
pertaining to issues not designated in the Notice of Appeal.
In Murray, we held that where the parties addressed multiple
issues presented to the District Court, but which were not
designated in the Notice of Appeal, we could nevertheless
review the non-designated issues. Accordingly, Macfarlan’s
Notice of Appeal, which referred only to an appeal from the
District Court’s Judgment denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, does not preclude us from addressing
Macfarlan’s other claims which were included in his amended
complaint.
II.
Beginning in 1989, appellant Alan Macfarlan worked
as a maintenance director at Green Acres Rehab and Nursing
Center (“Green Acres”). On January 24, 2008, Macfarlan had
a stroke, and on January 29, entered on leave under the
FMLA, which allows eligible employees, of which
MacFarlan was one, to take up to twelve weeks of leave due
to a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable
to perform the functions of the position of such employee.”
29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1).
At the time that Macfarlan entered on leave, Green
Acres’ human resources director prepared a FMLA request
form, which Macfarlan signed. That form noted that
Macfarlan’s FMLA leave began on January 29, 2008 and that

5

April 8, 2008 was his “[a]nticipated date of return” from
leave.1
Beginning in February 2008, Macfarlan received short
term disability benefits from his insurer, Unum Life Insurance
Company of America. On April 1, 2008, Green Acres was
purchased by appellee Ivy Hill SNF, LLC and renamed Ivy
Hill Rehabilitation and Nursing Care.
On April 16,
Macfarlan’s doctor cleared him to return to work starting on
May 1, but with the conditions that he not work more than
four hours per day and that he not lift or otherwise move
loads in excess of twenty pounds. The administrator of Ivy
Hill notified Macfarlan that part-time work was not available,
at which time, (April 17, 2008), Macfarlan’s doctor cleared
him to work full-time, but did not change the lifting
restriction.
On or about April 20, 2008, Ivy Hill terminated
Macfarlan’s employment and notified him of that fact, at the
same time informing him that he would not be hired back
with any lifting restrictions. From the time of his termination
1

According to Macfarlan, he selected the April 8,
2008 date because he had a doctor’s appointment scheduled
for that date. When that appointment was later rescheduled to
April 16, Macfarlan claims that he notified Green Acres’
human resources director. Macfarlan asserts that he was at no
point notified that, in spite of the rescheduled appointment, he
still needed to return to work by April 8. The District Court
never made findings of fact as to whether Macfarlan ever
notified Green Acres of the rescheduling, nor as to whether he
was ever notified that he would still have to return to work on
April 8.
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until July 2008, when he was ultimately cleared to work
without any restrictions, Macfarlan received disability
benefits from Unum, his insurer. Macfarlan was told that
once his lifting restrictions had ended, he could reapply for
employment with Ivy Hill, which he ultimately did in August
2008. 2 At that time, Macfarlan also stopped receiving
disability benefits.
On May 20, 2009, Macfarlan filed a complaint against
Ivy Hill. Macfarlan thereafter amended his complaint on
June 12, 2009, and drafted a further amendment to which Ivy
Hill consented on November 30, 2009. In his amended
complaint, Macfarlan raised four counts against Ivy Hill in
the District Court: 1) a claim for violation of the FMLA and a
retaliation claim for exercising his FMLA rights;3 2) a claim
for violation of the Rehabilitation Act; 3) a claim for violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and 4) a
claim for violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”).
On July 28, 2010, the District Court granted summary
judgment for Ivy Hill on all claims except Macfarlan’s claim
for violation of the FMLA. Following a motion by Ivy Hill
for reconsideration, the District Court granted summary
judgment for Ivy Hill on the remaining cause of action under
the FMLA on judicial estoppel grounds. Macfarlan filed a
2

Macfarlan’s application was unsuccessful, as during
his recovery, Ivy had filled the vacancy created by his
termination. Macfarlan does not challenge any element of
that employment decision in the present appeal.
3
Macfarlan does not appeal the District Court’s grant
of summary judgment on his FMLA retaliation claim.
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motion for reconsideration of that order, which was denied on
May 12, 2011. Macfarlan timely appealed to this court.
III.
The District Court had jurisdiction of Macfarlan’s suit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of
summary judgment. Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy
Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2001). We therefore
must undertake the same inquiry as the District Court and
determine whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the
moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A
material fact is one which “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We must also view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Macfarlan (the nonmovant) and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
IV.
Macfarlan’s principal contention is that the District
Court erroneously invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel
against him when it granted summary judgment to Ivy Hill on
Macfarlan’s FMLA claim. Macfarlan claimed in the District
Court that Ivy violated 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), which makes
“it unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or
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deny the exercise of or attempt to exercise, any right provided
under this subchapter.” Specifically, Macfarlan alleged that
by refusing to allow him to return to work on April 17, 2008,
once his doctor cleared him to work full-time, albeit with
restrictions, Ivy Hill had denied him of his rights under 29
U.S.C. §2614(a)(1), which provides that any employee who
takes FMLA leave “shall be entitled, on return from such
leave . . to be restored by the employer to the position of
employment [previously] held by the employee . . . or . . . to
an equivalent position.” In order to establish a claim for
violation of FMLA rights, an “employee only needs to show
that he was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that he
was denied them.” Callison v. Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117,
119 (3d Cir. 2005).
The District Court denied Macfarlan restoration to his
pre-leave position, holding that judicial estoppel precluded
him from seeking such restoration. Accordingly, we must
determine whether Macfarlan was entitled to his former
position under the FMLA. The FMLA does not require “an
employer to provide a reasonable accommodation to an
employee to facilitate his return to the same or equivalent
position at the conclusion of his medical leave.” Rinehimer
v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2002). In order for
an employee to demonstrate entitlement to restoration, the
employee must have been able “to perform the essential
functions of the job without accommodation” at the time he
sought restoration. Id.
In the District Court, Macfarlan argued that at the time
he sought restoration, he was able “to perform the essential
functions” of his job despite his physician’s restrictions. The
District Court concluded that Macfarlan was precluded, by
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the doctrine of judicial estoppel, from asserting that he was
capable of returning to work without accommodation at the
end of his FMLA leave in April 2008 because he continued to
receive disability benefits from Unum, his insurer, through
August 2008. The District Court therefore granted summary
judgment for Ivy Hill on Macfarlan’s FMLA claim.
Judicial estoppel is a “judge-made doctrine that seeks
to prevent a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent
with one that [he or she] has previously asserted in the same
or in a previous proceeding.” Ryan Operations G.P. v.
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir.
1996). The doctrine exists “to protect the integrity of the
judicial process and to prohibit parties from deliberately
changing positions according to the exigencies of the
moment.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750
(2001).
In Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160,
164 (3d Cir. 1999), this court expressly adopted the Supreme
Court’s framework from Cleveland v. Policy Management
Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), for the analysis of
judicial estoppel when the alleged prior inconsistencies affect
subsequent statutory claims.
Because the allegedly
inconsistent statements in the present case bear on
Macfarlan’s claim for statutory relief under the FMLA,
Motley instructs that we apply the Cleveland framework in
our analysis of the District Court’s order of judicial estoppel.
Under that principle, in order to defeat the application of
judicial estoppel, a plaintiff must explain his inconsistent
statements in a manner sufficient “to warrant a reasonable
juror’s concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the
plaintiff’s good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the
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plaintiff could nonetheless” perform the job to which he
sought reinstatement. Cleveland, supra, 526 U.S. at 807.
We must therefore determine: A) whether Macfarlan
made inconsistent representations, and B) if he did so,
whether Macfarlan can provide an explanation for his
inconsistency from which a reasonable juror could conclude
that, despite either the truth of, or Macfarlan’s good faith
belief in, his statements to Unum, he was nevertheless able to
perform the material duties of his regular job while he
collected benefits from Unum.
As a threshold matter, Macfarlan contends that the
District Court could only draw an inference as to any
statements he made to his insurer, and thus had no direct
record evidence pertaining to the content of those statements.
We cannot agree. One of the undisputed facts submitted as
part of Ivy Hill’s motion for summary judgment reads, in
part: “Plaintiff [Macfarlan] received Short Term Disability
Insurance benefits from his Carrier for a period of six (6)
months, from February through August, 2008, for the months
of January through July, 2008 based on his claims to his
Carrier and supporting medical documentation submitted to
them on his behalf by his physicians that he was unable to
perform the material duties of his regular occupation.”
(Emphasis added.) (A-117). On the basis of that undisputed
fact, the District Court had direct record evidence as to the
content of Macfarlan’s representations to Unum.
Having established that Macfarlan represented himself
in that manner, we must determine whether those
representations were inconsistent with his present position.
Macfarlan represented himself to Unum, his insurance
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company, as “unable to perform the material duties of his
regular occupation.” Furthermore, the coverage under which
Macfarlan received benefits from Unum explained that Unum
“provides you with benefits while you are unable to perform
the material duties of your regular occupation.” (Emphasis
added). Macfarlan accepted Unum benefits under coverage
for being “unable to perform the material duties of [his]
occupation,” and represented himself as such. There is
therefore no question that he did in fact take the position visà-vis his insurer that he was medically unable to perform his
occupation’s material duties. Macfarlan’s present position is
wholly inconsistent with that representation, as he now claims
that he was able to perform those same duties. Therefore,
unless Macfarlan provides an explanation for the
inconsistency that satisfies the Cleveland framework, as
discussed in Detz v. Greiner Industries, Inc., 346 F.3d 109 (3d
Cir. 2003), the District Court’s exercise of judicial estoppel
was proper.
This court has previously discussed the nature of such
explanations, spelling out that
the plaintiff may not, simply by disavowing a
prior claim of total disability, perform an
about-face and assert that he is a qualified
individual who is capable of working.
Rather, . . . the plaintiff must proceed from
the premise that his previous assertion of an
inability to work was true, or that he in good
faith believed it to be true, and he must
demonstrate that the assertion was
nonetheless consistent with his ability to
perform the essential functions of his job. . . .
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Explanations of the sort Cleveland requires
are, in short, contextual – they resolve the
seeming discrepancy between a claim of
disability and a later claim of entitlement to
work not by contradicting what the plaintiff
told the [benefits provider], but by
demonstrating that those representations,
understood in light of the unique focus and
requirements of the [benefits provider] leave
room for the possibility that the plaintiff is
able to meet the essential demands of the job
to which he claims a right under the ADA.
Detz, supra, 346 F.3d at 118.
Macfarlan explains his inconsistency by arguing that
he collected Unum disability benefits only because it was Ivy
Hill that had decided that he, Macfarlan, was unable to return
to work. He argues that he himself did not represent to Unum
that he could not work. Yet the statement that he gave to
Unum, and which is undisputed by Macfarlan, is “that he was
unable to perform the material duties of his regular
occupation.” Macfarlan’s effort to explain the inconsistency
is contrary to the Detz requirement that he treat his original
statement as true or as one that he in good faith believed to be
true. Just as the District Court did not accept this argument,
no more do we, and we hold that Macfarlan’s explanation
does not satisfy the requirements of Cleveland. The record
does not support Macfarlan, as we have pointed out, and we
find the same flaw in his argument that the District Court
judge did. Macfarlan’s statement to Unum “that he was
unable to perform the material duties of his occupation”
leaves no room for Macfarlan’s argument that it was not he
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that informed Unum that he was impaired, but that it was Ivy
Hill that did so. Macfarlan’s two claims “crash[] face first
against” one another, and the first estops the second. Detz,
supra, 346 F.3d at 120.4
V.
Macfarlan also claims that the District Court
erroneously granted summary judgment to Ivy Hill on his
Rehab Act, ADA, and PHRA claims. Specifically, Macfarlan
claims that the District Court erroneously concluded that Ivy
Hill did not consider Macfarlan to be disabled.
As an initial matter, we note that the Rehab Act, ADA,
and PHRA (“the Acts”) are all to be interpreted consistently,
and that all have the same standard for determination of
liability. McDonald v. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr.,
62 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Donahue v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2000); Kelly
v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). To prevail
on an action under the Acts, a plaintiff must establish that he
is a “qualified individual” with a “disability” who suffered an
adverse employment action “because of that disability.”
Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d
Cir. 2006).
To satisfy the requirement of having a
4

On appeal, Macfarlan urges that, even if the District
Court’s application of judicial estoppel was proper, other
judicial remedies could be fashioned. As an illustration, he
suggests reimbursing Unum for the benefits received during
the period in question. In light of our discussion, we see no
need to address this suggestion.
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“disability,” a plaintiff may demonstrate any one of: an actual
mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, a record of such impairment, or
that his employer regarded him as having a disability.
Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pa., 216 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir.
2000).
The District Court concluded, and Macfarlan does not
contest, that he had neither an actual impairment that would
satisfy the requirements of the Acts nor a record of such
impairment. Accordingly, Macfarlan’s claims under the Acts
rise or fall on the question of whether Ivy Hill regarded him
as having a qualifying disability under the Acts. We conclude
that the District Court properly found that Ivy Hill did not
regard Macfarlan as having such a disability. See Rinehimer,
supra, 292 F.3d at 382. (Rinehimer, a former employee of
Cemcolift, Inc. failed to show that he was disabled under the
“regarded as” prong of the Acts).
To demonstrate that an employer regarded an
employee as having a qualifying disability, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the employer believed that a wholly
unimpaired plaintiff had an impairment that substantially
limited at least one major life activity or that the employer
believed an employee’s actual impairment to limit major life
activities when it in fact did not. Tice v. Centre Area Transp.
Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2001). Macfarlan contends
that he falls into the latter category: that of an employee with
a non-limiting impairment incorrectly regarded as having an
impairment that limited him in at least one major life activity.
Specifically, Macfarlan claims that once he was cleared to
work fulltime, Ivy Hill incorrectly regarded him, because of
his lifting restrictions, as impaired in a manner that
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substantially limited him in the major life activity of
“working.”
A “temporary non-chronic impairment of short
duration is not a disability covered by the [Acts].”
Rinehimer, supra, 292 F.3d at 380. Macfarlan’s temporary
lifting limitations, which were removed only four months
after first imposed, are the very definition of such a nonchronic impairment. Accord Colwell v. Suffolk County
Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding that
an impairment lasting seven months was too brief in duration
to qualify as an ADA-qualifying disability).
Because
Macfarlan’s lifting restriction was not a qualifying disability
under the Acts, Ivy Hill’s regard of Macfarlan as unable to
perform certain of his duties was permissible under the Acts.
“It is insufficient for [Macfarlan] to show that [Ivy Hill]
thought [he was], in some way, impaired.
Rather,
[Macfarlan] must show that [Ivy Hill] thought [he was]
disabled within the meaning of the statute[s]. The undisputed
evidence shows that [Ivy Hill] did not consider [Macfarlan] in
any way disabled and would have reinstated [him]
immediately if . . . medically qualified.” (Internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d
166, 179 (3d Cir. 2007).
VI.
The District Court’s July 28, 2010 order granting
summary judgment to Ivy Hill on Macfarlan’s ADA, Rehab
Act, and PHRA claims will be affirmed, as well as its order of
May 12, 2011 denying reconsideration of its November 9,
2010 order which had denied Macfarlan relief under the
FMLA.
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